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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action for special and general damages suffered by the Plaintiff, Marvin F.
Morgan ("Mr. Morgan"), as a result of the wrongful death of his wife, Ella Morgan ("Mrs.
Morgan"), on February 23,2005. Mrs. Morgan had undergone treadmill and stress testing in
January 2004 at the Idaho Heart Institute in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Dr. John Chambers ("Dr.
Chambers") interpreted the results of those tests as suggesting the need for angiogram testing,
which he recommended. Mrs. Morgan scheduled the angiogram testing in reliance on Dr.
Chambers recommendation and with the expectation and understanding that Dr. Chambers would
perform the testing. The testing was rescheduled a number oftimes based on Dr. Chambers
unavailability and was finally scheduled for February 3, 2004. Mr. Morgan drove his wife to the
Idaho Heart Institute in the early morning hours on February 3, 2004, for the angiogram test by
Dr. Chambers. Without his knowledge, and he believes and asserts without the knowledge of his
wife, Dr. Michael Demos ("Dr. Demos") performed that test. Mrs. Morgan had never previously
met with Dr. Demos, now did she arrive at the Idaho Heart Institute that morning believing that
Dr. Demos was going to perform the test. Mrs. Morgan had not at any time established a
physician-patient relationship with Dr. Demos, nor consented to any care or treatment by Dr.
Demos, nor did she have any background information regarding Dr. Demos or even know that he
was at the Idaho Heart Institute. In addition, neither Mr. nor Mrs. Morgan was aware that Dr.
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Demos had been subjected to disciplinary procedures in at least three states prior to practicing
medicine with the Idaho Heart Institute.
Dr. Demos negligently performed the diagnostic angiobrram on February 3, 2004, causing
a dissection and damage to Mrs. Morgan's heart and right coronary artery, creating a medical
emergency which then necessitated a high-risk medical procedure in an attempt to repair the
damage. Complications of the original damage done by Dr. Demos ultimately resulted in the
death of Mrs. Morgan on February 24,2004. The autopsy performed after the death of Mrs.
Morgan revealed that she had no significant heart or cardiac issues prior to the damage caused by
Dr. Demos; and, that the medical procedure done after that damage had been done had not
repaired the extensive damage caused by Dr. Demos.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Mr. Morgan's original Complaint and Jury Demand was filed on August 3, 2006.
Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories was served on October 19, 2006, asking for (1) the

names and addresses of each expert witness to be called by Mr. Morgan in the trial of this matter;
(2) the subject matter on which each expert is expected to testifY; (3) the substance of the facts
and opinions to which each expert is expected to testify; and, the underlying facts and data upon
which the expert opinions are based, in conformity with Rule 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence
(IRE). Defendants Chambers and Demos followed on January 3,2007, with a new Interrogatory
No.8 mirroring the new Rule 26 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (IRCP) asking for a
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listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition
within the preceding four years.
Mr. Morgan filed an Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on May 11, 2007,
R. p. 28, and the Defendants Chambers and Demos filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on

November 23,2007, R. p. 35, arguing that Mr. Morgan did not timely file his complaint and had
not produced the necessary expert testimony. That motion was filed before discovery had been
completed and Mr. Morgan requested, and received, an extension of time to provide facts and
opinions essential to oppose the motion for summary judgment. Depositions continued through
April, 2008. On May 28, 2008, Mr. Morgan filed Plaintiff's Summary Judgment

lVlemorandum in opposition to motion of Defendants Chambers and Demos for summary
judgment and included a counter-motion for summary judgment, supported by the Affidavit of

Dr. Jay N. Scitapira, R. p. 44. The affidavit of Dr. Schapira was sufficient in confirming his
training and experience as an expert witness; confirming his knowledge of the standard of care
on that date in Idaho Falls, Idaho; confirming the angiogram performed by Dr. Demos was the
cause of Mrs. Morgan's death; confirming that the angiogram had been performed negligently;
confirming that Dr. Chambers' failure to perform the test when he said he would violated both
ethical and fiduciary duties owed to Mrs. Morgan; and, confirming that the death of Mrs. Morgan
was avoidable. The motions for summary judgment did not come before the District Court for
hearing until June 9, 2008, and the District Court's Opinion, Decision, and Order on Parties'

llfotions for Summary Judgment was not entered until August 28, 2008. That Opinion,
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Decision, and Order, R. pp. 68-77, confinned that the affidavit of Dr. Schapira established facts

and opinion showing that there was a genuine issue for trial; that lack of infonned consent did
not require expert testimony, but that issue was moot since Dr. Schapira's affidavit concluded
that there was a lack of infonned consent; but, that the Defendants Chambers and Demos also
asserted expert opinion establishing a genuine issue of fact for trial. The motions of Mr. Morgan
and Defendants Chambers and Demos were denied.
By Order Setting Pretrial Conference and Trial previously entered on June 11, 2008, R.
p. 64, trial was set initially for February 23,2009, with a requirement to provide a disclosure of

expert witnesses no later than 90 days prior to trial. Mr. Morgan identified his expert witnesses,
including Dr. Schapira, on November 29, 2008. Defendants Chambers and Demos filed their
first motion for continuation of trial which was heard on December 8, 2008. Mr. Morgan
objected based on his advanced age and infinnity, but the District Court continued and reset trial
for March 30, 2009.
Both Mr. Morgan and Defendants Chambers and Demos filed their required schedules of
witnesses and trial exhibits and it appears the matter was ready for trial. On March 20, 2009, just
10 days prior to the new date oftrial, Defendants Chambers and Demos filed their first
Defendants'Motion to Exclude Jay Schapira, M.D., R. p. 85, on the basis that Mr. Morgan had

failed to provide Defendants Chambers and Demos with a complete history of Dr. Schapira's
testimonial history in response to their Interrogatory No.8, alluding by affidavit of their attorney
to twelve (12) deposition/transcripts they had obtained from 2004 forward; and, alluding to
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information they had obtained reflecting twenty-one (21) other cases in which Dr. Schapira had
testified on malpractice cases relative to the negligent perfonnance of an angiogram or the use of
a catheter which were not disclosed. The argument of Defendants Chambers and Demos for
exclusion was that the proper test to be applied was "automatic exclusion" for failure to "exactly
comply" with Rule 26. R. p. 108. Although Defendants Chambers and Demos alleged that they
were "prejudiced", there was no specific reference to any factual basis for such prejudice
provided to the District Court.
Mr. Morgan objected to exclusion and at the hearing on March 24, 2009, the District
Court ordered Mr. Morgan's then counsel to provide a list of cases in which Dr. Schapira had
provided expert witness testimony by noon of the next day. Mr. Morgan's counsel responded
with Plaintiff's Notice of Compliance on March 25, 2009, R. pp. 269-285, containing not just a
list of 170 cases in which Dr. Schapira had previously testified, but a complete curriculum vitae
and referenced an additional sLy California Ll1edical Board cases in which Dr. Schapira had
appeared as a medical expert.
Defendants Chambers and Demos filed a Renewed Nlotion to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert
Witness Jay N. Schapira, NJ.D. on March 25, 2009, R. p. 129, claiming Mr. Morgan had failed

or refused to comply with the District Court's order, because Defendants Chambers and Demos
had identified/our (4) cases omitted from that list in which Dr. Schapira had provided
deposition testimony over the requested period. Counsel for Defendants Chambers and Demos
acknowledged that three (3) of those cases were available by internet search and that counsel for
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the Defendants Chambers and Demos had obtained the fourth case independently. In a
supplemental affidavit, R. p. 292-295, counsel for Defendants Chambers and Demos claimed to
have identified jive (5) other omissions from the list of cases, but those cases were not
identified. It is clear that this was not an issue of the requested information not being available

to Defendants Chambers and Demos, but rather that they had been required to obtain the
information independently, rather than it having been provided by Mr. Morgan's counsel.
Nevertheless, Defendants Chambers and Demos moved for exclusion pursuant to Rule 26 and 37
IRCP. Again, Defendants Chambers and Demos made no specific reference to any specific or
identified basis for prejudice caused by the claimed omission.
Mr. Morgan's counsel responded by emphasizing that any omissions were not the wilful
or dishonest act on the part of Mr. Morgan or his counsel. Nevertheless, by 1l1inllte Entry on
;+Iotion Hearing entered by the Court on the moming of the scheduled trial, the District Court

again continued trial to October 6,2009, for the sole purpose of allowing Defendants Chambers
and Demos additional time to prepare for trial based on the information now available relative to
Dr. Schapira. R. pp. 316-317. The District Court also allowed Defendants Chambers and Demos
to file a motion for sanctions for costs incurred in the continuance of trial.
Defendants Chambers and Demos filed their llfel1lorandlll1l of Expenses, emits and Fees
on May 1,2009, seeking costs as a sanction against Mr. Morgan and/or his counsel relative to the
second continuance of the trial, including $5,000.00 for expert witness fees for Defendants'
expert, Dr. Selzman. R. pp. 322-325. Total costs claimed were $23,268.40. Mr. Morgan's
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response and objection to the motion for costs as a sanction to the continuation of trial, R. pp.
371 -384, emphasized that the motion to exclude was groundless, referring to the four (4) cases,

three (3) of which actually had been disclosed and the fourth dealing with an employment
case, not a medical malpractice case; and, that the continuation of trial resulted only from the
delay of Defendants Chambers and Demos in waiting until the morning of trial to file a renewed
motion relative to disclosure of prior testimony. Counsel for Mr. Morgan also emphasized the
District Court's emphasis at the time of hearing that allowed costs would have to be shown to be
"extraordinary". None of the costs claimed were suggested to be, nor were they expressly
identified as being extraordinary. The claim for Dr. Selzman's fees was not even supported by
an affidavit from Dr. Selzman claiming that he would not have been able to professionally use
the time he was scheduled to testifY at trial, nor was there a showing that Dr. Selzman's fees had
actually been paid; and, in any event, the amount claimed was in excess of expert fees allowed
under IRCP Rule 54( d)( 1). Regardless, the District Court granted the motion for sanctions as

mandatory pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4) IRCP, R. Vol. IJJ, p. 437, T. p. 14, ll. 1-12, as to Dr.
Selzman's costs 0[$5,000.00; travel expenses for Dr. Demos consisting of$128.52 for a room
and air transportation of$1,612.30; travel agency fees of$120.00 for Dr. Demos and expert
witnesses; and, attorneys fees of $2,062.50 for trial preparation and $1,072.50 for preparation of
motion and supporting memorandum for sanctions, for a total of$9,995.82. R. p. 385.
With trial now set for October 6, 2009, Defendants Chambers and Demos waited until
August 17,2009, to file a Second Renewed Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Witness Jay
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N. Schapira, M.D., or Alternative ll'lotion to Dismiss, R. pp. 389-390. pursuant to Rule 702 of
the IRE and IRCP Rules 1,26 and 37. In the supportingi};lemorandum of Defendants
Chambers and Demos it was asserted the matter was back " ... due to Plaintiffs counsel's failure
or the failure of his expert witness to produce what has been demanded, Ordered, requested and
required ... " R. p. 570. There was no reference to any wilful, intentional or dishonest act on

the part of ~fr. l};lorgan, individually. Again, there was no reference to any specific prejudice
to Defendants Chambers or Demos. Reference was made to the District Court's comment that
there was no suggestion that failure to comply was for any sort of untoward reason, but rather
carelessness on the part of Dr. Schapiro to keep records. R. p. 572. Again, although it was
asserted that Defendants Chambers or Demos had been, or were, somehow prejudiced, there is

no factual reference to how Defendants Chambers or Demos had been or were, prejudiced.
Mr. Morgan's counsel filed Plaintiff's Memorandum Opposing Defendant's Second

Renewed Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Witness Jay Schapira, M.D. R. pp. 580-590;
supporting Affidavit of Counsel R. pp. 591-594; and, Affidavit of Jay N. Schapira, M.D. R. pp.

595-600, all emphasizing that no Order of the District Court had been violated; and, that
Defendants Chambers and Demos failed completely to show any improper conduct, let alone
intentional conduct or conduct on the part of Mr. Morgan personally, or any prejudice to
Defendants Chambers or Demos. R. p. 585. Mr. Morgan emphasized that discovery relative to
the substance of his case had been fully provided and the only reference to omission was as to
impeachment evidence. R. p. 587. The affidavit of Dr. Schapira also emphasized that the details
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of professional negligence as set forth in his prior affidavit has never been challenged or
countered by any of the Defendants. R. p. 598.
For some reason, the Order of the District Court on the hearing held September 1,2009,
was not entered until September 11, 2009, but is referenced in the Third Renewed iUotion to

Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Witness Jay N. Schapira, A1.D. of Defendants Chambers and
Demos, filed on September 4, 2009, again based solely on the allegation that Mr. Morgan had
failed to provide a complete list of Dr. Schapira's testimonial history from September 1,2005,
forward-apparently to September 1,2009. R. p. 603. Mr. Morgan was given until September 4,
2009, to provide that list. A list was faxed to counsel for Defendants Chambers and Demos and
counsel for Defendants Chambers and Demos responded by referring to one (1) case in that list
of which counsel was well aware was in Georgia, but which Dr. Schapira identified in that list as
being in Alabama. R. p. 606. Again, there is reference to general prejudice to Defendants

Chambers or Demos, but no factual basis provided for the alleged prejudice, nor was any
specific prejudice identified. R. p. 610.
Plaintiff's Memorandum Opposing Defendant's Third Renewed Motion to Exclude
Plaintiff's Expert Witness was filed by Mr. Morgan on September 11, 2009, R. p. 631, supported
by the Affidavit of Counsel Opposing Defendant's Third Renewed Motion to Exclude, R. pp.
638-643, and further supplemental response to Defendants' Interrogatory No.8 relative to Rule

26. R. pp. 644-673.
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The District Court entered its ill/inute Entry on September 15, 2009, granting the motion
of Defendants Chambers and Demos to exclude Dr. Schapira R. pp. 674-675 and its Order

Granting Granting Defendants' Third Renewed ill/otion to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Witness
Jay N. Schapira, il-LD. was entered on September 16,2009. R. pp. 676-677. Neither the
lv/inute Entry, nor the Order are supported by findings offact or conclusions of law.
By il-Jinute Ent1y dated March 8, 2010, the District Court granted Mr. Morgan's request
to petition the Supreme Court to accept the appeal ofthis case pursuant to Rule l2(b) IAR and on
that same date the status of the case was then changed by the Court Clerk from active to inactive.
It does not appear that notice of that change from active to inactive status was fonnally provided

to either party.
Mr. Morgan then filed a motion for pennission to appeal with the Idaho Supreme Court
and notes and emphasizes that when the Idaho Supreme Court denied that motion, the Order

Denying Motion for Permission to Appeal dated May 13,2010, remanded the case for further
consideration by the District Court and appears to contain a directive to the District Court on
remand that " ... the district court possesses authority to exercise its discretion and should

reconsider the order excluding Dr. Schapira and to evaluate the fact that prejudice does not
likely occur to defendants resulting from plaintiffs previous non-compliance with the court's
order regarding discovery." (Emphasis added.) A copy of that Order is attached, because it is
not contained in the Record, nor was a copy provided to the District Court Judge. Following the
issuance of that Order and until after there had been a substitution of counsel for Mr. Morgan on
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February 10,2012, there was no affinnative action taken by the District Court or any of the
parties to change the status of this case from inactive to active to reopen this matter or in
response to the directive from the Idaho Supreme Court.
Mr. Morgan obtained substitute counsel and Notice of Substitution was filed on February
22, 2012, R. p. 681, followed by a il1otion to Reopen and to Reconsider Order Granting
Defendants' Third Renewed 1110tion to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Witness Jay N. Schapira,
M.D. filed by Mr. Morgan on March 21, 2012, R. p. 683, supported by the Affidavit of the Mr.

Morgan confinning and emphasizing that he had thought that on remand the case had already
been reset for trial and that the District Court would reconsider the exclusion of Dr. Schapira. R.
pp. 685-686.

Defendants Chambers and Demos not only responded in objection to the 1110tion to
Reopen and to Reconsider, but also moved to completely dismiss the action pursuant to Rule

40( c) IRCP due to inactivity; or, alternatively, on the allegation that it should be dismissed
pursuant to Rule 41(b) IRCP, because Mr. Morgan's failure to prosecute had resulted in
"significant prejudice to the Defendants' ability to prepare and present their defense." R. pp.
687-6l~8.

Although the Memorandum filed on behalf of Defendants Chambers and Demos

suggested that some witnesses may be unavailable, there was no factual reference to any witness
who would be unavailable. R. p. 699. In fact, counsel for Defendants Chambers and Demos
admitted in his supporting affidavit that during the time the matter had been changed from active
to inactive status, he had no contact with experts. R. p. 710.
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Although Mr. Morgan's original Motion to Reopen and to Reconsider was filed
referencing Rule 60(b)( 6) IRCP, it was recognized later that a tinal judgment had never been
entered and an Amended JJ:/otion to Reopen and to Reconsider Order Granting Defendants'
Third Renewed iHotion to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Witne5is Jay N. Schapira, AL'D. was later
filed on April 9, 2012, pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2)(B) IRCP, R. p. 716, supported by Plaintiff's
il'/emorandum addressing the alternative motion of Defendants Chambers and Demos to dismiss
under either Rule 40(c) and/or Rule 41(b).
On May 24, 2012, the District Court entered its Opinion and Order on Plaintiff"s
iHotion to Reopen Case, denying that motion and granting the motion of Defendants Chambers
and Demos motion to dismiss based on the District Court's determination that dismissal under
Rule 40( c) was mandatory where there had been no action taken on this case for six (6) months.
R. pp. 724-727. No findings of fact or conclusions oflaw were filed in conjunction with that
Opinion and Order.
Plaintiff filed his Motion to Reconsider and to Alter or Amend Opinion and Order on
Plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Case on June 1, 2012. R. p. 729. In the meantime, a Judgment
was entered on June 4,2012, dismissing Plaintiff's action "without prejudice." R. p. 732. No
findings of fact or conclusions oflaw were filed in support of that Judgment. On June 21, 2012,
Defendants Chambers and Demos filed their Memorandum in Support of Defendants'
Opposition to Plaintiff'S Motion to Reconsider and to Alter or Amend Opinion and Order on
Plaintiff's il'/otion to Reopen Case. R. p. 734-738.
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A Notice of Appeal was filed on July 12,2012, to preserve Mr. Morgan's appeal of this
matter. R. p. 739.
The District Court's Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's il4otion to Reconsider and to

Alter or Amend Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's iUotion to Reopen Case was entered on
September 20,2012, denying Mr. Morgan's motion. R. pp. 752-757. No findings of fact or
conclusions of law were filed in support of that Order.
C.

STATEME~TOF

THE RELEVAc~T FACTS

The underlying facts which are the basis for Mr. Morgan's negligence claim against the
Defendants are not relevant to the issues that are before this Court on appeal i.e. the facts which
are relevant are those dealing solely with procedural issues leading to the District Court's
exclusion of Mr. Morgan's expert witness, Dr. Schapira; and, those procedural issues leading to
the District Court's ultimate complete dismissal of all ofMr. Morgan's causes of action pursuant
to Rule 40(c) IRCP.

There were no findings offact or conclusions of law filed by the District Court relevant
to any of the issues on appeal.
ISSUES ON APPEAL

The Appellant submits the following issues to be considered on appeal:
1. Whether the District Court erred in entry of its Order granting Defendants' motion for
sanctions dated and entered on July 10, 2009.
2. Whether the District Court erred in entry of its Order Granting Defendants' Third
Renewed Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Witness Jay N. Schapira, M.D. dated
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September 15, 2009, by not taking into consideration the failure of the Defendants to show any
actual prejudice which would have resulted from allowing Plaintiffs expert witness to testify at
the time of trial.
3. Whether the District Court erred in entering Judgment dismissing Plaintiffs cause of
action.
4. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys fees and costs on appeal, pursuant to
Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41 ?
ARGUMENT
A. ERROR IN GRi\i'lTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR S~i\i'lCTIONS
1. Order Granting Sanctions

Trial in this matter was originally set for February 23,2009. In spite ofMr. Morgan's
objection and his advancing age, it was continued the first time primarily so that Dr. Demos
could attend his son's wedding. There was no mention at the time of the first motion to continue
of the objection of Defendants Chambers or Demos to discovery information regarding Dr.
Schapira. Once trial was continued, Defendants Chambers and Demos then filed their first

Defendants'Motion to Exclude Jay Schapira, M.D., on March 20, 2009, just 10 days prior to
the new date of trial. The District Court responded by ordering Mr. Morgan's counsel to provide
a list of cases in which Dr. Schapira had provided expert witness testimony by noon of the next
day. In spite of the fact that Mr. Morgan's counsel filed an extensive list of 170 cases as ordered,
Defendants Chambers and Demos filed their renewed motion the very next day referencing an
omission of just four cases. Regardless, the District Court again not only continued trial, but
allowed Defendants Chambers and Demos to file for sanctions "incurred in the continuance of
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trial." The motion of Defendants Chambers and Demos for sanctions was filed pursuant to Rule
26 and Rule 37 IRCP. Defendants' Responsive Briefin Support of Their jlfotionfor Sanctions
appears to acknowledge that the motion was brought pursuant to Rule 37(b) IRCP, which gives
the Court the discretion to award attorneys fees and reasonable expenses as a sanction for failure
to comply with a discovery order. R. Vol. II, pp. 366-367. However, it is important to note that
Defendants Chambers and Demos never filed a motion to compel discovery, but rather an
immediate motion to exclude Mr. Morgan's expert witness for failure to comply with Rule 26;
and, it is important to note that the relative discovery order appears to have been the order
directing Mr. Morgan's counsel to file the list of cases to comply with Rule 26, which was more
than substantially complied with the very next day.

a. IRep Rule 37 Provisions.
IRCP Rule 37 clearly gives a court the discretion to award a party or party's counsel to
pay reasonable attorneys fees and/or expenses for failure to comply with a discovery order. Rule
37(a)(4) allows a party to recover the costs of obtaining an order to compel discovery and Rule
37(b) provides sanctions after a failure to obey an order to compel discovery. However, both
Rule 37(a)(4) and Rule 37(b) are inapplicable if there has not been a motion made or an order
entered to compel discovery. Frostv. Hofmeister, 97 Idaho 757, 761, 554 P.2d 935 (1976).

(Emphasis added). No such motion was ever made in the instant case i.e. the order directing Mr.
Morgan's counsel to file a list of cases was filed in response to the motion of Defendants
Chambers and Demos to exclude expert witne!iis. The proper procedure for Defendants
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Chambers and Demos to follow would have been to ask for an order to compel discovery
pursuant to Rule 26 and Rule 33. They did not do this and, as a result, were not entitled to ask
for sanctions which would have been proper had they followed the prescribed procedure. Absent
the authority of Rule 37, the District Court was without power to assess costs against Mr.
Morgan or his counsel. Frost v. Hofmeister, supra at p. 763.

b. Standard of Review of an Abuse of Discretionary Decisions.
Typically, when reviewing decisions of a lower court based on the abuse of discretion
standard, Idaho's Supreme Court considers whether (1) the court correctly perceived the issue as
one of discretion; (2) the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently
with legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) the court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. State Insurance Fund v. Jarolimek, 139 Idaho 137, 138-139,75 P.3d 191
(2003). Mr. Morgan acknowledges that as the appellant, he bears the burden of showing such an
abuse of discretion and must do so by showing that the District Court's findings are clearly
erroneous and that it did not properly identify and apply the law to the facts found. Southern

Idaho Production Credit Association v. Astorquia, 113 Idaho 526, 528, 746 P.2d 985 (1987)
citing Shelton v. Diamond International Corp., 108 Idaho 935, 703 P.2d 699 (1985).
c. Attorneys Fees and Expenses Awarded were Clearly Erroneous.
In spite of the fact that Defendants pursued sanctions under IRCP Rule 37(b), the District
Court granted the motion for sanctions as mandatory pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4) IRCP, R. Vol. Ill,
p. 437. T p. 14. ll. 1-12, as to Dr. Selzman's costs of$5,000.00; travel expenses for Dr. Demos
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consisting of 5128.52 for a room and air transportation of 51 ,612.30; travel agency fees of
S120.00 for Dr. Demos and expert witnesses; and, attorneys fees of 52,062.50 for trial
preparation and $1,072.50 for preparation of motion and supporting memorandum for sanctions,
for a total of59,995.82. The District Court's decision was clearly erroneous on the basis that (1)
the District Court did not correctly identifY this decision as being discretionary, not mandatory;
and, (2) there was no finding of fact supporting the basis for Dr. Selzman's costs and no finding
of fact was made that the remaining costs were "extraordinary", which was the standard the
District Court itself indicated would apply. R. Vo!. III, p. 436, T p. 11, fl. 11-21. In any event,
without there have first been a motion to compel discovery, the District Court was without
authority to award sanctions. Frost v. Hofmeister, supra at p. 763.
B. ERROR IN EXCLUDlNG PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT ·WITNESS
1. Order Granting Granting Defendants' Third Renewed Motion to Exclude

Plaintiff's Expert \Vitness Jay N. Schapira, M.D.
The District Court's Order Granting Granting Defendants' Third Renewed il1otion to

Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Witness Jay N. Schapira, il1.D. entered on September 16, 2009, was
made pursuant to IRCP Rule 37(b), without specific reference to which subpart of that Rule
applies. Nevertheless, the effect of that order was a dismissal of Mr. Morgan's negligence action
and with prejudice, because Mr. Morgan had no other expert witness who could appear at trial on
the issue of negligence and the applicable statute oflimitations would have precluded a renewed
cause of action.
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b. Standard of Review of an Abuse of Discretionary Decisions.

Mr. Morgan as appellant has already identifIed the general standard of review that applies
to discretionary decisions under IRCP Rule 37(b). However, when reviewing a trial court's
decision to impose the drastic sanction that has the effect of a dismissal with prejudice, Idaho's
Supreme Court has indicated that it will review the decision to ensure certain findings are met i.e.
given the extreme nature of a dismissal with prejudice, this Court has required trial courts to
consider three factors when considering such a decision: The two primary factors are a clear
record of delay and ineffective lesser sanctions, which must be bolstered by the presence of at
least one "aggravating" factor, including: 1) delay resulting from intentional conduct, 2) delay
caused by the plaintiff personally, or, 3) delay causing prejudice to the defendant and the
consideration of these factors must appear in the record in order to facilitate appellate review.

State Insurance Fund, supra at p. 139. (Emphasis added).
c. Clear Abuse of Discretion.

The District Court in this case, as was the case in State Insurance Fund, failed to
articulate what specific prejudice Defendants Chambers or Demos would suffer if Dr. Schapira
was allowed to testify or why the prejudice would be so serious that it would outweigh the
prejudice to Mr. Morgan of the impossibility of going forward without his only expert witness on
the issue of negligence. There is no indication in the record that lesser sanctions would have
been ineffective here to secure Mr. Morgan's completion of discovery responses while
protecting the rights of Defendants Chambers and Demos.
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C. ERROR I~ E~TERI~G JUDGMENT DIS~IISSI~G PLAI~TIFF'S CAL'SES OF ACTION

1. Judgment Dismissing Plaintiff's Causes of Action.
The District Court's final Judgment dismissing all of Plaintiff s causes of action was
entered based on its Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's 1110tion to Reopen Case entered on May
24,2012, denying Mr. Morgan's Amended 1110tion to Reopen and to Reconsider Order
Granting Defendants' Third Renewed 1110tion to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Witness Jay N.
Schapira, lW.D. and granting the motion of Defendants Chambers and Demos to dismiss based

on the District Court's determination that dismissal under Rule 40(c) was mandatory where there
had been no action taken on this case for six (6) months; and, District Court's subsequent
Opinion and Order on Plaintiff's il1otion to Reconsider and to Alter or Amend Opinion and
Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Case entered on September 20,2012, denying Mr.

Morgan's motion to reconsider.
The opposition of Defendants Chambers and Demos to Mr. Morgan's motion to reopen
this matter and to reconsider the order excluding Mr. Morgan's expert witness were based solely
on IRCP Rule 40(c) and Rule 41(b).
2. Rule 41(b) Motion

Defendants Chambers and Demos acknowledged that a dismissal of an action under the
provisions ofIRCP Rule 41(b) is the most severe sanction that a court may apply, and its use
must be tempered by a careful exercise of judicial discretion, citing Kirkham v. 4.60 Acres of
Land, 100 Idaho 781, 784, 605 P.2d 959 (1980). In the case of Gerstner v. Washington Water
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Power Co., 122 Idaho 673, 677, 837 P.2d 799 (1992), also cited by Defendants Chambers and
Demos, the Idaho Supreme Court referenced Jensen v. Doherty, 10 1 Idaho 910, 911, 623 P.2d
1287, 1288 (1981), in which the Idaho Supreme Court had articulated the function of a Rule
41 (b) involuntary dismissal as being" ... in the nature of a sanction. It is a necessary final
recourse available to the court to protect its processes and other litigants from abuse." The Court
also stated that because it is a sanction rather than a remedy, courts should use involuntary
dismissals sparingly. When deciding whether to dismiss a case the district court must consider
the length of delay caused by the failure to prosecute, the justification, if any, for such delay, and
the extent of any resultant prejudice. Gerstner v. Washington Water Power Co., supra at p.
677. On that issue, Defendants Chambers and Demos stated " ... some of the experts that the
Defendants had originally intended to relay may now be unavailable to testifY." (Emphasis

added.) Whether they mayor may not be available is speculative and does not constitute the
actual prejudice mandated by Gerstner. Likewise, Defendants Chambers and Demos stated that
Kymberli Brock, FNP, has moved to Alaska and will "likely be unable to testifY in this matter."
Her availability is speculative and does not constitute the actual prejudice that is required.
Defendants Chambers and Demos stated that Susan Collins has left her position as Idaho Heart
Institute's Practice Manager and "may be unavailable to testifY." Her availability is speculative
and does not constitute the actual prejudice that is required.
The keystone of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is liberality which favors a final
decision predicated on the merits over a dismissal based upon a technicality. IRCP Rule 1(a)
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provides that the rules "shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding."

Gerstner v. Washington Water Power Co.,

supra at p. 675.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Gerstner, Id. at p. 675, noted that it is appropriate to give
consideration to the words of wisdom from Justice Shepard and Justice Donaldson, both now
deceased, dealing with similar situations.
In Harris v. Beco Corp., 110 Idaho 28, 713 P.2d 1387 (1986), Justice Shepard wrote:
I find it difficult to believe that the majority of the Court has departed from the
previous strong policy providing parties with their day in court. That policy has held to be
the essence of our rules of civil procedure. Sines v. Blaser, 98 Idaho 435,566 P.2d 758
(1977). As has been said by the United States Supreme Court, 'a person's right to his day
in court is basic to our very system of jurisprudence.' III re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct.
499,92 L.Ed. 682 (1948). Harris, 110 Idaho at 30,713 P.2d at 1389.
Justice Donaldson, in Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 715 P .2d 993 (1986), wrote:
We begin our discussion by noting that technical rules of pleading have long been
abandoned in this state. Rauh v. Oliver, 10 Idaho 3, 9, 77 P. 20, 21-22 (1904). The
general policy behind the current rules of civil procedure is to provide every litigant with
his or her day in court. Sines v. Blaser, 98 Idaho 435, 437,566 P.2d 758, 760 (1977).
The rules are to be construed to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action or proceeding. LR.C.P. l(a) ... Clark, 110 Idaho at 325, 715 P.2d at 994.
Also in Gerstner v. Washington Water Power Co., supra at p. 677, citing Day v. CIBA

Geigy Corp., 115 Idaho 1015, 1018,772 P.2d 222, 225 (1989), the Idaho Supreme Court noted
that it had set out circumstances where a dismissal constitutes an abuse of discretion:
[T]he rule of Grant v. City of Twin Falls, 113 Idaho 604, 746 P.2d 1063 (Ct.App.1987),
can be stated as follows: It is an abuse of discretion to use the power of dismissal to
punish a period of delay which no longer exists if the defendant has not established
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prejudice resulting from the delay. The rule places key emphasis upon demonstrated
prejudice to the defendant's ability to present a defense rather than upon the length of the
period of delay per se.
In Gerstner v. Washington Water Power Co., supra at p. 677, Idaho's Supreme Court
also referenced Systems Assoc. v. Jlotorola Comm. & Elecs., Inc., 116 Idaho 615, 778 P.2d 737
(1989) in noting that it had re-emphasized this rule and explicitly disavowed federal cases which
allow Rule 41 (b) dismissals based upon prej udice presumed to flow from unexcused or
unreasonable delay:
In light of Day, we conclude that the reliance on federal authority interpreting the
inapplicable federal rule [Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) is identical to I.R.C.P. 41(b)] was in error
and lead to an erroneous statement ofIdaho law. Again, the correct statement ofIdaho
law is that "[iJt is an abuse of discretion to use the power of dismissal to punish a period
of delay which no longer exists if the defendant has not established prejudice resulting
from the delay. f! Day, 115 Idaho at 1018, 772 P .2d at 225. Motorola, 116 Idaho at 619,
778 P.2d at 741.
In both Motorola and Grant, it was noted by Idaho's Supreme Court that case activity
had been resumed prior to the filing of the Rule 41 (b) motion, while Gerstner was dormant at the
time of the Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss. Gerstner v. Washington Water Power Co., supra at
p.677. That is exactly the situation which existed in this case i.e. the Clerk of the Court had
placed this case in inactive status and it had never been resumed at the time Defendants
Chambers and Demos filed their Rule 41 (b) and Rule 40( c) motions to dismiss.
Clearly, Idaho's Supreme Court does not promote Rule 41 (b) dismissals and apparently
the District Court determined that it would have been inappropriate to exercise of its discretion in
dismissing Mr. Morgan's causes of action pursuant to Rule 41 (b) and Mr. Morgan, as appellant,
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does not take exception to that decision.
It is emphasized that the District Court made no reference to Rule 41(b) based on

prejudice to the Defendants, nor was any actual prejudice shown by the Defendants as required
under that Rule. The District Court based its decisions leading to the dismissal of Plaintiffs
cause of action solely on Rule 40(c) IRCP.
2. Rule 40(c) Motion
IRCP Rule 40( c) provides:
Rule 40( c). Dismissal of Inactive Cases.
In the absence of a showing of good cause for retention, any action, appeal or
proceeding, except for guardianships, conservatorships, and probate proceedings, in
which no action has been taken or in which the summons has not been issued and served,
for a period of six (6) months shall be dismissed. Dismissal pursuant to this rule in the
case of appeals shall be with prejudice and as to all other matters such dismissal shall be
without prejudice. At least 14 days prior to such dismissal, the clerk shall give
notification of the pending dismissal to all attorneys of record, and to any party
appearing on that party's own behalf, in the action or proceeding subiect to dismissal
under this rule. (Emphasis added.)
It must be emphasized from the onset that the District Court treated dismissal under Rule

40(c) as mandatory, not a discretionary decision. R. Vol. IV, p. 726. In Agrodyne, Inc. v. Beard,
114 Idaho 342, 345, 757 P.2d 205 (Ct. App. 1988), it was noted that a dismissal based on Rule

40( c) is a discretionary decision and will be upheld unless it is found that the lower court abused
its discretion. As previously noted, when reviewing decisions of a lower court based on the
abuse of discretion standard, Idaho's Supreme Court considers whether (1) the court correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) the court acted within the boundaries of such
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discretion and consistently with legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) the court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State Insurance Fund v. Jarolimek, supra at pp.
138-139. Further, when reviewing a trial court's decision to impose the drastic sanction that has
the effect of a dismissal with prejudice, Idaho's Supreme Court has indicated that it will review
the decision to ensure certain findings are met i.e. given the extreme nature of a dismissal with
prejudice, this Court has required trial courts to consider three factors when considering such a
decision: The two primary factors are a clear record of delay and ineffective lesser sanctions,
which must be bolstered by the presence of at least one "aggravating" factor, including: 1) delay
resulting from intentional conduct, 2) delay caused by the plaintiff personally, or, 3) delay
causing prejudice to the defendant and the consideration of these factors must appear in the
record in order to facilitate appellate review. Id. at p. 139. (Emphasis added).
In this case, it is emphasized that (1) the case was dormant at the time Mr. Morgan filed
his motion to reopen the matter and his request that the District Court reconsider the dismissal of
his expert witness; (2) the District Court should have, but did not, reactivate the case and then
give proper notice of an intent to dismiss as required under Rule 40( c); (3) the District Court did
not properly recognize a dismissal under Rule 40( c) to be a discretionary decision; and, (4) the
District Court failed to recognize that even though it ordered a dismissal "without prejudice", the
effect of dismissal in this case was "with prejudice" based on application of the statute of
limitations that precludes Mr. Morgan from refiling an action for negligence against these
Defendants. The District Court should have considered whether there were any "aggravating
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factors" that justified dismissal, which it did not do and there were no such aggravating factors in
this case.
D.

ATTO~~EYS

FEES AND COSTS O~ ApPEAL

Mr. Morgan is entitled to an award of attorneys fees and costs on appeal under Idaho
Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 4l. I.C. § 12-121 and LAR. 41 allow for the
award of attorneys fees and costs in a civil action where the matter was defended frivolously,
unreasonably and without foundation. I.AR. allows for the award of costs to the prevailing party
on appeal. It is clear that Defendants Chambers and Demos sought the exclusion of Mr.
Morgan's expert witness without having first filed a motion to compel and there was no basis for
the District Court had no authority to exclude Mr. Morgan's expert witness under Rule 37 absent
such a motion. Given the fact that this case was dormant at the time Mr. Morgan filed his motion
to reopen the matter and his request that the District Court reconsider the exclusion of his expert
witness in compliance with the Supreme Court's directive, there was no basis for either a Rule
41 (b) or Rule 40( c) motion. For these reasons, Mr. Morgan, as appellant, is entitled to an award
of attorneys fees and costs on appeal.
CONCLUSION
First and foremost, it is emphasized that Mr. Morgan's causes of action have already
survived the motion of Defendants Chambers and Demos for summary judgment on all issues
and was several times set for trial and would have gone to trial, except for the repeated motion of
Defendants Chambers and Demos to prejudice Mr. Morgan by not allowing his expert witness to
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - Page 25 of 26

testify. The motion to exclude was improper; the orders continuing trial and granting sanctions
based on that motion was improper; the motion to dismiss based on Rules 41 (b) or Rule 40( c)
was improper; and, the District Court's decision to dismiss as mandatory based on Rule 40(c)
was improper. Mr. Morgan urges this Court to set aside the order granting sanctions; set aside
the District Court's order excluding his expert witness; and, set aside the order dismissing his
causes of action and remand this matter with a directive that the District Court immediately place
this matter back on the trial calendar. The Plaintiff is now 87 years old and has waited patiently
believing that his case would be heard. He is entitled to his day in Court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

I ~day of April, 2013.

M. BRENT MORGAN, CHTD.

Attorney for Respondents
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this LSJay of April, 2013, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF was served on the following named person(s) at the
addresses shown and in the manner indicated:
Matthew F. McColl
CAREY PERKINS LLP
P.O. Box 519
Boise, 10 83701-0519
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
IN THE MATTER OF PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL.

)
)

--------------------------------------------------------

)

MARVIN F. MORGAN,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
PERMISSION TO APPEAL
Supreme Court Docket No. 37518-2010

)

MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, M.D.;
JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR., M.D.; and
IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE, P.c.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Ref. No. 10-119

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL with attachment and an
AFFIDA VIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO
APPEAL were filed by counsel for Plaintiff on March 22, 2010. Thereafter, an AFFIDAVIT OF
COUNSEL IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL with
attachments was by filed counsel for Defendants on March 25, 2010. The Court is fully advised;
therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO
APPEAL be, and hereby is, DENIED as the subject of the appeal does not present "a controlling
issue of Jaw as to which there [are] substantial grounds for difference of opinion" as required by
LA.R. 12(a). The subject of the appeal relates to a discretionary -decision of the trial court. The
legal standards goveming the district court's exercise of discretion are well established in this state.
This order does not represent a determination of the merits of the proposed issue on appeal.
It is noted that the jury trial has evidently been vacated and no new date for trial has been set.
Under these circumstances, the district court possesses authority to exercise its discretion and
should reconsider the order excluding Dr. Schapira and to evaluate the fact that prejudice does not
likely occur to defendants resulting from plaintiff's previous non-compliance with the court's order
regarding discovery.

May. 17. 2010
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DATED this
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Lowe 11 Hawke s

P. 3/3

13!h day of May 2010.
By Order of the Supreme Court

cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Judge Jon 1. ShindurJing

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL - Docket No. 37518-2010

